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Abstract 
In  his  model  of a  rent-seeking  contest,  [Tullock, G.,  1980. Efficient  rent  seeking.  In:  Buchanan,  J.M., Tollison,  R.D., 
Tuliock,  G.  (Eds.),  Toward  a  theory of the  rent-seeking  society,  Texas  A  and  M  University  Press,  College  Station,  pp. 
97-II 21 uses a simple concrete specification  tbr the probability functions which determine the probability that a player wins 
the contest,  given  the bids  made  by the players. We  discuss  in general  terms a  set  of conditions  that can  be  imposed on 
probability  functions  in this game. Next, we show that the specification  chosen  by Tullock  is the  unique  one  that satisfies 
these conditions.  ©  1997  Elsevier Science  S.A. 
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1.  Introduction 
Tullock (1980) has introduced a well-known  model of a rent-seeking contest in which two players 
compete  for a  rent  of value  V,  say.  The  probability  that  player  1 wins  the  contest  is  given  by  the 
function p(x~, x 2), where x i is the bid (effort) put forward by player i (i =  1, 2). The probability  that 
player 2 wins equals  1 -  p(x~, x 2). Tullock, and a large literature following him, used a concrete (iogit 
type) specification of the function p(x~, x~).  In this paper we will demonstrate that Tullock's concrete 
specification  must be used if one requires that a probability  function of this game has to satisfy  a set 
of general, reasonable, conditions that will be presented below.  Doing so, we provide a motivation for 
the  use of Tullock's  concrete specification.  See  also  Skaperdas  (1996). 
2.  The  analysis 
Let us define the set S = {(x~, x2)[x ~ >0,  x 2 >0} and  let p(x~,  x 2) be an arbitrary  fanction, defined 
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on  S,  representing  the  probability  that  player  1  wins  the  contest.  Clearly,  we  must  have 
O<.~-p(x~,x2)<-I  for  all  (x~, x2)ES.  The  expected  payoff  of  player  1  equals  zr,(x~, x2)-p(x ,, 
x,.)V-x~. We will consider the following conditions that can be imposed on p(x~, x_,): 
(i)  p(x~,  x,.)  is  a  continuously  differentiable  function  with  [Op(x~, x,.)/Ox~]>O  and  [O"p(x,, 
x,.)/~x~]<O  for all (x~, x,.)ES; 
(ii) p(Axj,  Ax,)=p(x~, x.,) tbr all (x~, x,)ES  and all A>O; 
(iii) p(xl,axt)=  .~  for all x~>O and some given a>O; 
(iv) lOp(x,, x,_)/~gxll Ixttp(x ,, xa)l=r(I-p(x,,  x,.))  for all (x I, x,.)ES  and some given r>O. 
Let us discuss  the  meaning of these conditions.  Condition  (i)  requires  that p(x~, x,.)  is  a  'smooth' 
function of xl  and x.,. It seems reasonable to require that the probability to win reacts in a  'smooth' 
way on  the bids of both  players.  Further,  it  imposes  the  standard  requirement  that p(x~, x.,)  is  an 
increasing  and  strictly  concave  function  in x~.  The  strict  concavity  implies  that  the  maximization 
problem of ¢r~(xt, x,)  with respect to x~  (given x,)  is well defined, i.e.  there exists a unique global 
maximum.  Condition  (ii)  states  that p(x~,  x,)  is  homogeneous  of degree  zero,  i.e.  if both  players 
multiply their bids with the same factor A, then the probability that player I wins the contest remains 
unaffected. In other words, only the relative size of the bids matters. We remark here that one might 
possibly argue, that the probability that player I wins, should be a function of the absolute size of the 
difference between the bids of the players. However, such an approach easily leads to problems, e.g. 
with the requirement that p(x~, x,.) is strictly concave in x~  (take e.g. p(x~, x,.)=[lll  +exp(x2-x ~  )]). 
In order to discuss condition (iii), first suppose that a = I. We then see that if both players make the 
same bid, each one has the same probability to win the contest. In case a >  1, there is a bias in favor of 
player  I:  i.¢.  if  player  1  bids  x~,  then  player  2  must  bid  ax~(>xl)  in  order  to  have  the  same 
probability to win as player 1 has. Analogously, there is a bias in favor of player 2 in the case a <  1. 
Finally, condition (iv) states that the elasticity of the probability that player 1 will win the contest with 
respect to his own bid x t, is proportional to I-p(x m, x2). This reflects the natural requirement that the 
elasticity must be  equal  to zero  in the  case p(x~, x~)= i.  Further,  it  incorporates  the  idea that  the 
percentage change in p(x a, x,) implied by, say, a one per cent change in xj  is smaller, the closer is 
p(xt, x,) to unity. We note that the magnitude of the parameter r determines the 'overall' sensitivity of 
p(x~, x.,) with respect to x,. 
Proceeding forward,  let us suppose  that our (arbitrary) probability function p(x,, x 2) satisfies  the 
conditions  (i)  up  to  and  including  (iv).  Using  condition  (i)  we  then  can  define  the  continuously 
differentiable  function  l~(X) for  all  x>0  according  to  ff(x)  --- (x,  I).  Notice  that  ff(x)=p([xj/x2] , 
I)=p(x~, x~) with x=(xllx2).  Next, observe that 
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with x=(x~ Ix2). Combining this with condition (iv), we see that p(x) satisfies the differential equation 
dp(x)  x 
dx  p(x) 
-  r(l  -  ,O(x)),  (2) 
or, equivalently, 
dp(x)  dx 
=r~  (3)  p(x)( l -  p(x))  x 
Integrating both sides of this equation  we find that p(x)  must  satisfy 
(l~(x)  ) 
log  l-p(x)  =rlogx+A,  (4) 
where  A  is  the  integration  constant.  Substituting  x=(I/a)  in  the  latter  equation,  and  noting  that 
condition  (iii)  implies  that/~(~,) = ~,  we  conclude  that  A =  -r  iog(,l ).  Using  this,  we  see  that pt.r~ 
must equal 
(t/X) r 
p(x) =  (ax)' +  I"  (5) 
In turn this implies that 
(ax I )r 
,.  (6)  P(X~'X2) =  (axe)"+ x 2 
for all (x~, x,)ES.  The conclusion is that if we require that a probability function p(x~, x,.) satisfies the 
conditions (i) up to and including (iv), then p(x~, x 2) must be given by (6). We observe now that (6) is 
in fact the specification used by Tullock (1980).  See also Leininger (1993), (p. 48) and Yang (1994). 
Finally, we remark  that  the requirement  that p(.r~, x 2)  is  strictly concave  in x~  holds if and  only if 
r._~  <- I, cf.  Baye et al.  (1994),  (p.  367). 
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